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on Current South African Questions 
To ards a 
Procedural 
Revolution 
by Rob Amato 
This is an attempt at a procedural 
solution to the present political and 
economic logjam in South Africa. The 
aim is to find ways to alleviate some of 
the difficulties faced by the major 
parties to the conflict and to 
facilitate their reaching agreement on 
rules under which they can compete, not 
negotiate, as political forces. 
If we depend on their negotiating in vacuo on 
constitutional or policy matters we will 
continue our descent into mindlessness, our 
fate determined by reaction, often violent, 
on all sides. 
This is not an appeal for the abandonment of 
positions by any parries to the conflict. In 
a sense a middle ground is not being sought. 
Violence is an expression of anguish and of a 
lack of alternatives. Procedure can provide 
channels for the clear expression of con-
flicting ideologies and interests. The 
tension between "enemies" cannot be wished 
away, but opposition might, by procedural 
structures, be rendered a productive 
phenomenon displacing violence. 
The main difficulty is that there is no body, 
internal or external, which can draw up a 
procedural framework. Such a body should be 
formed and should be made up of juridical 
(tha't is, procedural) experts nominated by 
all contenders for power in a new South 
African dispensation. 
Stage 1: Committee of Heralds 
But who will form the juridical body? 
Prominent political figures of all kinds 
could take the initiative to form a 
collective catalyst for the formation of the 
body. They would have to speak from all 
points on the political spectrum and agree on 
one thing only - that a juridical body whose 
members were nominated by political 
organisations (contenders for power?) of all 
significant kinds should be set up. 
This ad hoc committee might have difficulty 
in settling on a Chairperson. His or her 
function would, however, be so much an 
administrative one that his political 
inclinations or position would not be vital 
factors in his effectiveness. He might be 
anyone noted and respected for good manners, 
good judgement and efficiency. Perhaps a 
certain kind of judge. 
The ad hoc committee would concern itself 
only with calling on all contenders for power 
to nominate procedural experts from within or 
without our borders to a Juridical Council. 
The com mittee would stand down once the 
Council was established to start Stage Two. 
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significant kinds should be set up. 
This ad hoc committee might have difficulty 
in settling on a Chairperson. His or her 
function would, however, be so much an 
administrative one that his political 
inclinations or position would not be vital 
factors in his effectiveness. He might be 
anyone noted and respected for good manners, 
good judgement and efficiency. Perhaps a 
certain kind of judge. 
The ad hoc committee would concern itself 
only with calling on all contenders for power 
to nominate procedural experts from within or 
without our borders to a Juridical CounciL 
The committee would stand down once the 
Council was established to start Stage Two. 
The high profile political figures would now 
be a liability if they were perceived as 
influencing the CounciL 
The ad hoc Committee's Chair would of course 
also stand down, but only at the still-to-
come stage when the Juridical Council 
appoints its Chair. 
Stage 2: Juridical Council's formation 
and Project 
At Stage Two the Juridical Council would 
elect a Chair (from within or without its 
ranks - perhaps an ex Chief Justice or World 
Court Judge) who would call on all political 
organisations of substance to submit, within 
a limited period, a mandated formal 
statement, under co-ordinated topic headings, 
of their proposals for the new South African 
Constitution. This would be a different 
activity to presenting a party's policy 
documents. 
Political organisations not yet represented 
on the Council would have the right to 
nominate their own experts to serve as 
Councillors at any stage (up to a certain 
date, or until the Council completes its 
tasks). 
Because the Council would have an editorial 
rather than a decision-making brief the 
numbers and alignments of the contributing 
parties would not be of crucial importance to 
its proceedings. The Council would not 
decide which of the proposals submitted to it 
were most worthy of implementation. Its 
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Chair and Committees, each devoted to a 
significant constitutional topic, would 
reduce the number of proposals received to a 
minimum number of models, Constitutions A, B, 
C, etc. Obviously the Council's skills will 
be directed towards maximising the areas of 
consensus and clarifying points of 
difference. The process of collation would 
conclude Stage Two. 
Each Constitution's elements would by now be 
trenchantly expressed in a covering document 
and details would be codified in supporting 
docum entation. 
Stage 3: One-adult one-vote Referendum 
The third stage would be the presentation, to 
the entire citizenry of the country, of the 
various constitutions in a judicially 
administered one-adult one-vote referendum. 
Each voter would indicate the constitution he 
or she most favoured. 
The winning constitution, even if no outright 
majority were achieved, could amount to a 
social contract arrived at by deliberate 
choice following informed debate, a degree of 
grassroots education - and due democratic 
procedure. It would not be an imposed set of 
rules. 
Stage 4: First Election under New 
Constitution 
The rules for the first election in the new 
state would have been established and the 
election - the fourth stage - could proceed 
immediately, to be followed, one hopes, by a 
long series of elections, under the same 
constitution, in which power might well 
change hands fairly often. 
There is no point in speculating here on what 
combinations of groupings would win the first 
or subsequent elections, but one long-term 
speculation (or article of faith) is worth 
expressing here. 
It is that the groupings that determine this 
country's politics will have more to do with 
individual sensibilities and class positions 
than with race, or ethnic origin, or 
language. 
The process here outlined would encourage 
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this because people would be voting (in the 
referendum) for the first time in our lives 
as individual members of the entire 
citizenry. 
Difficulties abound in the procedure, as 
everyone is quick to point out. The 
following is a list of the most salient of 
the objections I have met with, and my 
answers to them. 
- "The procedure depends on a one-adult one-
vote referendum and it is precisely on 
this point that the opposed parties differ 
most. II 
Of course the bottom line to any ANC, Azapo 
or UDF manifesto is universal franchise and 
the government would have to extend its 
commitment on single and equal citizenship to 
the franchise in any form of settlement 
whatsoever. It is actually questionable 
whether universal franchise is really the key 
issue, for other, more difficult, issues back 
up behind it, such as nationalisation and 
privatization; land useage and ownership -
and the nature of the Bill of Rights. The 
universal franchise issue is a shibboleth to 
be got behind us. The franchise (perhaps 
unfortunately) is not the process which most 
limits the actions of modern governments for 
most of their lives. The protective and 
limiting clauses of a good constitution would 
form a much more pervasive and day-to-day 
inhibition to abuse of power than the fear of 
losing a forthcoming election, though this 
must be present too. 
- "No party to the conflict will enter into a 
process from which it may emerge the 
loser. II 
The only reason that the government or the 
ANC might agree to take part in the process 
is that they would then be seen to be willing 
to present themselves for real legitimization 
as rulers or contenders for power in a new 
dispensation. It may be true that they care 
only for power and not a fig for 
legitimization but this may be untrue. 
Governing South Africa without the consent of 
the governed will be, increasingly, a very 
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difficult business, no matter who is trying 
to do it. 
- "The ANC and the government are 
increasingly adopting warlike postures and 
so the process will not get off the 
ground.." 
The ANC and the government are both central 
actors in a drama that involves all the major 
world powers in some measure. There IS 
nothing to prevent them continuing their 
bellicose postures while entering the 
process, which does not in fact involve any 
commitment to mutual recognition or to 
negotiation. The public remain the arbiters 
of validity. 
An important point here is that the process 
will tend to force participants into 
negotiation and compromize with their 
political neighbours rather than their 
lIenemies". The philosophy will be that the 
worse the opposition f s proposed constitution 
is, the better, so leave them to it. 
Each grouping will have to consider if and 
how it should accomodate other groups in 
order to widen support for its constitutional 
proposals, but it could leave those groups it 
wants nothing to do with to their own 
devices. The ANC or the government or anyone 
else would therefore not be compromized or 
lose face by entering the process. 
The tendency of each party will be to propose 
a constitution that would favour their direct 
supporters but in so doing, on many issues, 
they would simultaneously find themselves 
favouring other groupings 
The process would thus tend to marginalize 
extremism and, if it in fact did so, a 
government of Left, Centre or Right could be 
returned in any election. Thus, ideally, 
procedural union activity, ordered and 
equitable land reform and ordered 
nationalization would be processes 
acknow ledged to be constitutionally valid on 
the one hand, and on the other hand 
delineated individual rights to the freedoms 
of speech, religion, association and 
movement, to modest and reasonable 
compensation, to smaller business activities 
etc., would also be constitutionally 
protected. 
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- "How can the government of the day enter 
into a process which looks towards its own 
demise?" 
The answer here is that the National Party 
has to look towards its survival (perhaps in 
altered form) after the democratization of 
the country as a whole. There is reason to 
suppose that widespread conservative impulses 
among blacks as well as whites will playa 
part here. 
It is possible, if not likely, that Mr Botha 
and his party are tired of the impossible 
position that the opposition, internal and 
external, and the "international community" 
have been complacently putting him into, to 
the country I s great cost. 
I mean that were the proposal widely approved 
he would no longer have to be a judge in his 
own cause, proposing statutory bodies "under 
my chairmanship" to decide upon electoral 
procedures in which he will himself want to 
be a winning contender. 
It is not beyond the bounds of possibility 
that the Government could fly the proposal -
or one like it - avowedly as a kite in order 
to test whether it will in fact produce a 
Constitution under which the vast majority of 
South Africans could live with a sense of 
justice, and a dynamic political life 
involving ordered, continuous and meaningful 
change. 
And the process would allow the ANC to 
continue to consolidate itself in the mind of 
the country as the focus for a possible and 
procedurally sophisticated alternative 
government. 
16th June 1986 
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